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ABSTRACT 
This paper introduces an extended hierarchical task 
analysis (HTA) methodology devised to evaluate and 
compare user interfaces on volumetric infusion 
pumps. The pumps were studied along the dimensions 
of overall usability and propensity for generating 
human error. With HTA as our framework, we 
analyzed six pumps on a variety of common tasks 
using Norman’s Action theory. The introduced 
method of evaluation divides the problem space 
between the external world of the device interface 
and the user’s internal cognitive world, allowing for 
predictions of potential user errors at the human-
device level. In this paper, one detailed analysis is 
provided as an example, comparing two different 
pumps on two separate tasks. The results 
demonstrate the inherent variation, often the cause of 
usage errors, found with infusion pumps being used 
in hospitals today. The reported methodology is a 
useful tool for evaluating human performance and 
predicting potential user errors with infusion pumps 
and other simple medical devices. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Predicting Human Error: The study of human error 
and error prediction is one that has long incubated 
within its parent fields of human factors and systems 
engineering. It has given rise to any number of 
formal methodologies, such as fault tree analysis and 
failure modes and effects analysis1. All share the 
common goal of helping analysts predict and analyze 
the types of errors that can occur in any situation of 
human and machine interaction.  
 
More recently interest has spread to cognitive theory-
based methods of task description and error 
prediction that focus on people and how they think 
and behave2. These aim to explain failures on the 
human side of the interaction using theory and 
findings from cognitive psychology. Rather than 
treating human error as a product of some invariable 
stochastic function, their purpose is to pinpoint 
specific causes and mechanisms.  
 
For instance, GOMS analysis2 breaks down tasks into 
Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection rules to 
describe task procedures in a way that accounts for 
human cognition and performance. Since it describes 
the procedural knowledge involved in a task, it can 
be used to model the human side of any instance of 
human-computer interaction and help identify 
potential areas of operator error.  
It is critical to apply these types of techniques to 
medical devices because the underlying problem with 
them is often cognitive3. This is increasingly 
becoming true as medical devices become 
progressively computerized. Hence, effective design 
and redesign efforts to promote comfortable, 
effective, and safe use can only be done with 
consideration of human cognition. 
Human Error in Medicine: Since the release of the 
Institute of Medicine medical error report in 19994, 
human errors in medicine and patient safety have 
become of great concern in the medical field. Like 
other landmark events in the history of human 
factors, such as the nuclear accident at Three-mile 
Island, this occurrence and others have boosted 
awareness of human factors within this domain. 
Device level incidents stemming from poorly 
designed interfaces have become particularly 
problematic with advances in technology. The 
literature has long suggested that the number of 
injuries resulting from these types of problems far 
exceed that of injuries due to device failures5. 
 
Today, most medical device manufacturer’s websites 
and advertising claim that human factors are of high 
priority in their designs. Nevertheless, a simple 
search on the FDA Manufacturer and User Facility 
Device Experience Database (MAUDE)6 for most 
common medical devices will bring up any number 
of reported “usage” problems. Considering the 
absence of a widespread, formalized means for 
predicting human errors at the human-device level 
and evaluating interfaces for error-generating 
propensity, this is not surprising. Should such a 
method exist, manufacturers would have greater 
ability to accurately test and design their devices for 
safe use. Moreover, purchasers concerned about 
safety would be better equipped to discern among 
models for use at their respective facilities. 
 
While the prospect of uncovering an infallible 
method for predicting human error given an interface 
and task still seems distant, the present state of theory 
and research on human error in the fields of human-
computer interaction (HCI) and cognitive science 
seems sufficient to provide improvement over 
currently techniques. This will prove invaluable if 
successfully applied in the medical arena where 
human lives are consistently at stake. This work 
represents one such effort.  
Volumetric Infusion Pumps: One pervasive device 
in medicine that has led to numerous medical error 
incidents is the innocuous volumetric infusion pump. 
Used for the controlled delivery of medication, these 
devices greatly advanced the state of intravenous 
therapy. Nevertheless, major problems with them 
have been revealed publicly7. 
 
From the standpoint of pure research, the volumetric 
infusion pump provides a relatively simple 
benchmark medical device on which human error 
treatments and theory may be developed and tested. 
Having grown increasingly computerized and 
complex over the years, they have fallen into the 
domain of human-computer interaction (HCI) and 
cognitive engineering. It now seems more sensible 
than ever to apply existing knowledge from HCI and 
cognitive science pertaining to interface design in the 
medical domain.  
METHODS 
Hierarchical Task Analysis: Hierarchical task 
analysis (HTA)1, one of the most widely used forms 
of task analysis, involves describing a task as a 
hierarchy of tasks and subtasks. The initial step in our 
own methodology was to construct HTAs of three 
typical infusion tasks for the pumps under study. Our 
approach is similar to that of Rogers and colleagues8 
who applied this basic technique in the evaluation of 
a simple medical device.  
 
As Reason9,10 recommends, a task analysis is critical 
because it provides the necessary information for the 
analysis and prediction of operator error (e.g., goals, 
tasks, and subtasks). It aptly represents the 
transitional flow of the interaction in a format useful 
to the evaluator (in plans of interaction). This 
information may then be iteratively used to extend 
evaluation to account for both distributed 
representations3 and what Reason calls error 
“affordances”9,10 or error-shaping factors predefined 
by psychological research (e.g., steps with high short 
term memory demands). 
Decomposing task structures into reoccurring 
“components” or subtasks reveals identifiable 
patterns. We can highlight them simply on a 
spreadsheet using colors, permitting visual 
comparisons across different pump models. Longer 
procedures, intuitively, have been shown to decrease 
usability and increase potential for error8. 
Multiple Tasks: It is unlikely that a single 
programming task will utilize all commonly used 
features on a pump. Hence, conducting task analyses 
on each pump for multiple tasks allows for a more 
thorough evaluation. Steps or interface artifacts that 
are particularly likely to elicit user errors will be 
identified as they reappear in the evaluation across 
tasks. By tabulating and comparing the number of 
external representations, error affordances, etc., we 
can expand our basis for prediction. Finally, 
collapsing the data provides a single metric of error 
propensity for general comparison across pumps. To 
allow for stronger comparisons, similar tasks are used 
both on the single and multiple channel pumps. 
Norman’s Action Cycle: In order to bring the 
relevant cognitive processes into consideration, we 
conduct our analysis following Norman’s Action 
cycle11. This widely cited theory decomposes 
interaction between human and computer into seven 
basic stages of user activity (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Norman’s Action Cycle 
 
To reduce the possibility of human error, Norman 
recommends that the Gulf of Evaluation (right side), 
or the gap between Perception and Evaluation, and 
the Gulf of Execution (left side), or the gap between 
Intention and Action, be made as narrow as possible. 
Direct interaction is the ultimate goal. Hence, the 
device should provide quick and informative 
feedback and heavily nested functions should be 
avoided as much as possible. Any necessary 
information for operation should be displayed 
intelligently on the device itself. 
Distributed Representations: Examining each 
discrete step in our task analysis along Norman’s 
seven stages of action requires the evaluator to 
concomitantly identify the appropriate internal and 
external representations involved. According to 
Zhang and Norman12, this will establish the cognitive 
task space of the human-device interaction. 
Following the Action theory, external 
representations, where the information is present on 
the device itself rather than in the head of the 
operator, are thought to drastically reduce or 
eliminate human error. Internal representations 
depend on cognitive processes for retrieval, whereas 
external representations rely on more efficient 
perceptual processes, hence mitigating cognitive 
load. Of course, this is contingent upon the correct 
mapping of functions on the interface with the 
internal knowledge of the user.  
 
For accurate evaluation of these representations, it is 
necessary to consider all information presented by the 
device. This includes auditory warnings, text 
messages, LEDs, physical controls, etc., which 
determine the external problem space and provide 
context for the evaluator. Research shows that the 
specific wording and presentation of labels and 
feedback messages have great impact on the actions 
users decide to take13. Listing all state and 
transitional information makes it possible for the 
evaluator to identify deficiencies in the external 
problem space. 
 
Output Presentation: Presenting the final output of 
these theories and methodologies in a compact 
tabular form (Figure 2) allows the evaluator to 
visualize and predict where possible errors may 
occur, rate their severity, estimate relative task 
completion times, and, most importantly, contrast 
across different devices. This type of detailed 
cognitive task analysis can be useful for pump 
manufacturers, hospitals, and other decision makers 
to assess and compare different pump models taking 
into account patient safety-critical information.  
 
Evaluation of our analyses reveals a great deal of 
variability in task space constraints as well as error 
affordances between the six pumps under study, 
predicting that some will be more error prone and 
difficult to use than others. For this paper we will 
contrast findings from two different pumps and 
compare our relative predictions to FDA error reports 
from MAUDE. 
 
Figure 2. Tabular output (sample)
RESULTS 
Sample: To make the methodology and process more 
concrete, a sample analysis will be presented in detail 
using two unnamed single channel pumps X and Y. 
Pump X is a widely used single channel volumetric 
infusion pump from a large, longstanding medical 
device manufacturer. Well recognized and touted for 
its human-centered design, the pump brings with it 
several human factors improvements over the 
previous technology. Nevertheless, a quick search on 
the FDA database proves that it is not problem-free. 
 
Using pump X and a competing pump Y from 
another large manufacturer (>30% U.S. market 
share), we will demonstrate how this methodology is 
applied. Both single channel pumps will be analyzed 
on two different tasks to show their intrinsic 
differences. 
 
Procedure: In this sample evaluation we will use 
two of the original three single channel tasks. Task 1 
and 2 follow: 
 
1. Orders: Infuse 1000 ml Normal Saline at 125 ml per hour. 
Goal: Verify fluid is flowing to patient. 
 
2. Orders: Infuse 1000 ml of NS at 125 ml per hours as a 
continuous infusion. Give 1gm Ceftaxidime (Fortaz) IVPB q 8 
hr.  Administer over 30 minutes. 
Goal: Verify fluid is flowing to patient. 
 
Number Goal/Method GOMS Operators Physical State Previous Screen Current Screen Auditory Warnings Softkey 1
1.00 Prepare Device
1.10 Plug in Insert plug Plugged in/off/unloaded
1.20 Make sure Lockout is off Verify Lockout status
1.30 Turn device on Press 'Power' Plugged in/on/unloaded Instrument information; 
Standard display
Audio test "beep" STNDBY
2.00 Prepare Set
2.10 Move AccuSlide flow 
regulator clamp down until 
it clicks closed
Slide clamp
2.20 Spike the fluid container. Spike container. Plugged in/on/unloaded Standard display Standard display STNDBY
2.30 Fill drip chamber to fill line Wait for chamber to fill Plugged in/on/unloaded Standard display Standard display STNDBY
2.40 Open AccuSlide clamp to 
prime set
Open clamp; wait Plugged in/on/unloaded Standard display Standard display STNDBY
2.50 Close AccuSlide clamp 
when priming is complete
Close clamp Plugged in/on/unloaded Standard display Standard display STNDBY
Starting from a given order and goal, we construct 
our initial HTAs. Operations vary depending on the 
particular pump, but major subtasks, such as the 
programming of an infusion rate or the loading of 
tubing remain constant. Using expert knowledge and 
the manufacturer’s user manuals, tasks are 
decomposed into their constituent subtasks and 
operations. When finalized, this leaves us with a 
basic framework for each pump and task.  
 
State information is next added aside each step in the 
table and indicates, most generally, the status of the 
device. For example, a given state might indicate that 
the device is powered on. More detailed information 
is provided under separate columns for auditory cues, 
display messages, “softkey” information, etc. 
Previous state and display information dictate the 
context the user is given as they proceed to the next 
step. This information is used to decide what must be 
done on the subsequent screen, and thus has a great 
effect on the user’s behavior. 
 
Using the completed state, display, auditory, and key 
information columns, we fill in a column for external 
representations12. For the internal representations we 
use a GOMS type analysis that answers the question 
of what declarative knowledge or mental operator is 
needed by a user to complete a particular subtask. 
 
Finally, from these two columns we follow the seven 
steps of the Action cycle to deduce where possible 
errors might arise (affordances). Going through the 
steps (e.g., Perception) for each subgoal (e.g., turn 
device on), we check if the device provides sufficient 
external representations (e.g., Is there information on 
the device to indicate how to turn on the device?) to 
satisfy the needs and deficiencies of the internal rules 
or representations. A poorly determined external 
problem space suggests room for human error. 
Additionally, steps that fit one of Reason’s 
predefined error provoking factors (affordances)9,10 
are also noted. A few of these appeared across both 
tasks, presenting a greater likelihood for error. 
 
Analysis: Figure 3 shows a breakdown of the total 
number of steps, internal and external 
representations, and error affordances for pumps X 
and Y on Tasks 1 and 2, respectively. Conditional 
steps, or steps necessary only given some 
precondition were omitted.  
 
The number of MAUDE usage-related errors 
reported during the 2001-2002 period has also been 
added under “Reports” for reference. These do not 
include mechanical failures. 
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 Figure 3. Task 1 and 2 totals 
 
Comparisons between the pumps are possible by 
simply counting the number of overall steps or 
operations needed8, as well as the number of 
affordances. Looking at Figure 3, pump X has nine 
(Task 1) and ten (Task 2) more affordances. This 
follows the trend of usage-related problems found for 
each pump on MAUDE (four for pump X versus one 
for pump Y) in 2001. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Six pumps (three single channel and three 
multichannel) in all were analyzed using the method 
described. As with pumps X and Y, there was a large 
degree of variation on the final output of the 
analyses. While it may be argued that the pumps with 
fewer required operations also had fewer options, 
counting options was not the focus of this 
methodology. Undoubtedly, there will be some 
tradeoffs made in any engineering or purchasing 
decision. Moreover, more steps did not always 
translate to more affordances, as some pumps had 
extra steps for “forcing functions”. These act to force 
the user to verify their settings or inputted values and 
thus actually contribute to overall safety. 
 
Even pumps from the same manufacturer showed 
large differences in their task structures. This 
presents a potential problem for hospitals employing 
temporary nurses who may need to use different 
pump models with little or no training beforehand. In 
separate controlled experiments, several fourth year 
nursing students complained that they could not 
complete the tasks because, “they did not have much 
experience” with a certain pump. Many went on to 
incorrectly complete the programming tasks. This is 
in spite of being given a ten-minute demonstration of 
the pump functions prior to the test, as is often the 
case in practice.  
CONCLUSION 
The methodology reported here will not predict every 
possible human error given an interface. The 
capricious nature of human behavior makes this 
nearly impossible. As is the shortcoming of all 
techniques in interface evaluation, it also offers no 
suggestions for redesign.  
However, a careful evaluator should be able to make 
general predictions of relative error propensity 
between pumps and identify potential error inducing 
features and steps. While the technique remains 
dependent upon the skill of the evaluator, we believe 
it is a step in the right direction. It upholds the value 
of considering cognition when assessing the safety of 
a medical device through the employment of 
cognitive theory. And our methodology can be 
practical; as demonstrated, simply tabulating the 
external features of an interface side-by-side with the 
steps required allows quick contrasts across different 
pump models. 
 
Work in Progress: To further validate and refine our 
methods, we will compare our analyses and 
predictions with data from controlled user studies. 
We are also working to streamline this process, to 
reduce dependency on the evaluator’s skill level. 
 
Suggestions for Further Work: These analyses 
provide all of the necessary information to produce a 
working computational model. Existing unified 
theories of cognition, such as ACT-R14, already 
provide a proven framework for predictive models 
that can account for human cognition and well 
describe interactive behavior and error15. Extending 
this type of approach to the medical domain could 
indeed prove beneficial, as safety and time critical 
applications abound. 
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